On 24 November, a leaked letter from the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) to the National Oil Corporation (NOC) claimed that the NOC had under-declared approximately $3.2 billion in oil revenue over the past few years and had failed to transfer this revenue to the proper account. This was in response to a statement by the NOC issued on 22 November directly criticising the CBL for misrepresentation of various facts regarding oil revenue generation, storage and distribution over the last year and for its lack of transparency over the last nine years, which it claimed has provided the perfect pretext for those forces who wish to blockade oil terminals. As the crisis escalated, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj convened an emergency meeting on the morning of 1 December, summoning NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanallah, GNA Planning Minister Taher al-Juhaimi, GNA Finance Minister Faraj Bumtari and CBL Governor Sadiq al-Kabir. The political and security tracks of the Berlin process laid out in January 2020 have been taking place much more overtly than the third economic track. Although the economic track is, in theory, happening behind the scenes and a statement was issued from UNSMIL on 1 December, nothing has been achieved in terms of arriving at a consensus solution as to how the money from oil exports will be spent. Each major actor in this drama should be seen as trying to assert himself as the one who deserves control over how this pot of money is spent. Serraj is also facing corruption charges at the public prosecutor’s office, and further moves to get his hands on the money held in the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB) could help fuel these accusations. Given that Kabir is not likely to be easily dismissed and has thwarted previous moves by Serraj to evict him, some kind of compromise on how the money is spent could emerge from today’s meeting convened by Serraj. Alternatively, if Serraj is perceived as overreaching, he could be shot down by various domestic constituencies and internationals, leaving the crisis unresolved. The feuding statements between the NOC and CBL are likely to continue, and represent attempts to shift blame onto other parties, but they do not bear directly on the real issues of how the money will be spent and how the Libyan public financial management system operates.