Game Theory, Kidnappings and the Pitfalls of Appeasement in Libya

No matter how you slice it, releasing a convicted terrorist as a means to free a kidnapped ambassador is appeasement and sets a dangerous precedent which is likely to lead to further kidnapping. I expanded on this argument in a piece in the Middle East Eye.

On the face of things, it might seem a fair proposition to speculate that high-level decision makers in the Jordanian or Libyan governments would understand iterative game theory – the study of strategic decision making - better than the thugs of ragtag Islamist militias.  However, recent events suggest the Libyan militias are geniuses at extortion, blackmail, kidnapping, and intervening in the political process. So much so, that it seems they are displaying a good grasp of the nuances of game theory.As Karim Mezran, Mohamed Eljarh and I have explained in a recently published Atlantic Council report, “Libya's Faustian Bargains: Ending the Appeasement Cycle”, appeasement is always a trap - the more you practice it the harder it becomes to break out of the cycle.So the situation in Libya today has reached something of the natural conclusion of the cycle of appeasement of which kidnappings are only one manifestation.  Other key manifestations are granting important government posts to militia- or jihadist-aligned individuals such that whole branches of the government, especially the Defence or Interior ministry, have been colonized by specific localities, regions, or militias.The primary issues must be solved by Libyans themselves, who need to confront the enemies of law and order in their own midst and double down on their transition process to constitutional governance.  Nonetheless, Libya's nascent central authorities could use a little help from their friends.