On January fourth, the Islamic State in Libya again targeted Libya's al-Sidra terminal. Two suicide trucks attacked the main checkpoint to the terminal and set the fuel tanks on fire. ISIS also took over the Harouge (formerly Veba) oil company buildings in Sidra as well. The attack was quickly repulsed a by PFG forces who managed to kill 5 and arrest 7 ISIS supporters. Nonetheless, it would be a misinterprettation to see these developments as a setback for ISIS.
Sources report a large mobilisation of ISIS heavy artillery to the towns of Noufaliyah, Harawah and Bin Jawwad. This indicates that the group is actually expanding its range of operations and are successfully capitalizing on the political vacuum to become central Libya's most dynamic military force. According to Benoit Faucon of WSJ ISIS is employing a strategy similar to the one they used in Syria and Iraq of sabotaging key oil installations so that they are of less value to the government, then once they are more loosely defended, capturing them.
Predictably, Haftar and his allies are trying to be seen as riding to the rescue. As such, there are also reports of LNA airstrikes near Sidra on ISIS targets. A counteroffensive could be developing but it seems unlikely that the requisite actors would be able to put aside their petty grievances to work together coherently against ISIS. Although ISIS do not control any oil ports yet, various publications and leaks suggest that British SAS special forces could be preparing to lead an international team to take back control of any oil fields which would fall under ISIS control. This seems not feasible as the international community's first task is to implant the National Unity Government in Tripoli and let that government 'call' for international support against ISIS before acting.
And even more predictably, attempts to stand up the unity government are faltering. An attempt by the UN envoy Martin Kobler, to convince the Tripoli-based GNC to support the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) ended in failure after talks in the Libyan capital with GNC President Nuri Abu Sahmain collapsed.
As the GNA struggles to form a government, relocate to Tripoli and even obtain HoR approval, IS looks intent on capitalising on the power vacuum. Unfortunately, the weakness of the GNA’s presidency council and its PM, in contrast to the high-visibility of the actions taken by the UN envoy, are sending very negative signals about the actual content of sovereignty and legitimacy in the new government. However many moderate and sensible Libyans support the GNA it still has the optic of being an ineffectual Western implant. This optic plus the intractable disagreements about Haftar’s role and the location of any GNA continues to undermine and render ineffective the already fragile political agreement. Only a bold act of leadership by the main militia leaders and political factions to put aside their petty grievances and work together against ISIS can save Libya from falling further into the abyss.