Ethan Chorin has long argued that America and the West were wrong to engage with Qadhafi. Weirdly he somehow believes that American and Western incorrect actions back then have led to Western failures and missteps in post-Qadhafi Libya. For me the issues are rather separate. The Western countries have made many policy missteps in their attempts to support Libya post-Qadhafi but the irony is that these mistakes have not only not been systematic but they have been quite haphazard and grounded in an ability to engage sufficiently.On May 28, Chorin wrote an op-ed in the NYT which sketched out some of the key dilemmas facing American policymakers relative to Hiftar's movement and in this regard, he and I agree. The US should clarify that it is not and will not support an anti-democratic takeover in Libya that mirrors Sisi's power-grabbing behaviors in Egypt and would negate and undo the transition process in Libya. On this Chorin and I are 100% in agreement. And yet, he made a range of very false and counterproductive assertions. Ironically, he did so without even attempting to demonstrate or support his claims. Therefore, I felt as a matter of principle compelled to set the record straight by writing a letter to the editor of The New York Times. I think the editors there immediately understood that they had published potential falsehoods and were eager to use my letter to set the record straight. You may read my letter published in the June 9, NYT by clicking here or read my review of Chorin's book by clicking here. Also the text of my letter is presented below:
Re “The new danger in Benghazi” (Opinion, May 28): Ethan Chorin correctly warns of the danger of Gen. Khalifa Hiftar’s anti-Islamist paramilitary movement attempting a crude power grab. Mr. Chorin’s counsel to American policy makers to distance themselves from General Hiftar while reiterating their support for Libya’s derailed formal transition process is a wise one.
Yet where Mr. Chorin errs is to write that “America has gotten into trouble in Libya by not taking clear positions. During the 2003 rapprochement, we told Colonel Qaddafi we had conditions for reconciling with him. Then we didn’t enforce them.” This is the same sort of analysis Mr. Chorin puts forth in his book, “Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution,” in which he claims that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi outfoxed the West, which engaged in Libya out of greed.
Mr. Chorin’s conspiratorial analysis is sexy, but plays rather loose with the facts. The United States enforced the terms of the 2003 bargain with Colonel Qaddafi as much as it could. Moreover, the American foreign policy establishment and business community never fully embraced Colonel Qaddafi. It was their calculated engagement with the dictator that opened Libya up for a modicum of economic development, globalization, and eventually a revolution aimed at freeing the Libyan people.
The writer also insinuates that the Islamist takeover in Benghazi was due to American actions and inactions. In reality, it was due to the Libyan General National Congress’s policy of appeasing the militias. Getting the facts of this history right is essential. The facts highlight that Libya’s destiny is decided by Libyans and that the West must engage in a supporting role with whatever legitimate government is in place (no matter how flawed or weak) and seek to help the Libyan people fulfill their aspirations to be full-fledged members of the international community.
Jason Pack, Cambridge, England
The writer is a co-author of “Libya’s Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle.”