On 19 July, Jason Pack, the founder of Libya Analysis, published with Al-Monitor an analysis of the crisis that recently unfolded in the Oil Crescent. The article draws on Pack's previous article published on 29 June with Al-Monitor. Pack demonstrates that the Oil Crescent crisis proved indeed to be more about redistribution of revenues and institutional reforms than for control for oil export. Pack writes:
In reality, Hifter’s decision to hand over the oil crescent ports to the Eastern NOC was likely initially impulsive, and then two loose goals wound up being grafted onto it. Those goals are 1) to conceal his weakness at briefly losing control of the oil crescent ports to militia leader Ibrahim Jadhran the previous week by showing strength by standing up to the international community; and 2) to secure consistent funding for his Libyan National Army (LNA) — the center of his political and military power — by forcing his political adversaries in western Libya to reshuffle administrative control of the CBL and alter the distribution of oil revenue.
Highlighting the results of General Haftar's strategy, Pack questions whether the recent developments can lead to political progress in Libya. According to him:
This unfortunate episode may have keyed important international actors into the essential fact that distribution of oil revenue is a far more important and intractable problem in Libya than organizing a timeline for elections, and that a resolution of this dilemma necessitates action at the central bank. Since no progress on a political settlement can be made so long as militia smuggling remains profitable due to the black market dinar rate and the extensive subsidies, stasis at the CBL effectively turns Libya into a frozen post-Soviet-style conflict until international actors impose changes on Libya’s macroeconomic arrangements. On the bright side, international actors are clearly more aware now than ever about what really needs to be done to break the stalemate. Indeed, if there is any glimmering of political will in London, Washington, Rome or Brussels, the most motivated and neutral power could convene the major Libyan players and force open a new space for genuine political negotiations on the distribution of oil revenues. Such negotiations would need to culminate in a new social contract for all Libyans. We should all thank Hifter for illuminating, to a broader audience than ever, that this alone is the way out of Libya’s political gridlock.
Lachlan Wilson contributed to this piece.
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